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Abstract
We review decision-making along the cancer continuum in the contemporary context of informed 
and shared decision making, in which patients are encouraged to take a more active role in their 
health care. We discuss challenges to achieving informed and shared decision making, including 
cognitive limitations and emotional factors, but argue that understanding the mechanisms of 
decision making offers hope for improving decision support. Theoretical approaches to decision 
making that explain cognition, emotion, and their interaction are described, including classical 
psychophysical approaches, dual-process approaches that focus on conflicts between emotion 
versus cognition (or reason), and modern integrative approaches such as fuzzy-trace theory. In 
contrast to the earlier emphasis on rote use of numerical detail, modern approaches emphasize 
understanding the bottom-line gist of options (which encompasses emotion and other influences 
on meaning) and retrieving relevant social and moral values to apply to those gist representations. 
Finally, research on interventions to support better decision making in clinical settings is 
reviewed, drawing out implications for future research on decision making and cancer.
Keywords
heuristics and biases; decision aids; medical decision making; informed decision making; risk 
communication
Decision making about cancer—especially about cancer treatments—might seem to be a 
simple matter: choose the option that prolongs life most. If treatments are equivalent in 
prolonging life, then choose the one that maximizes quality of life (e.g., has fewer side 
effects). However, research has shown that cancer decisions are not so simple. This research 
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illuminates how people make such high-stakes decisions and how to help people make 
decisions that improve their physical and mental health.
In this article, we provide a brief overview of research on decision making and cancer. Our 
main goal is to encourage additional research on this important topic by highlighting what is 
known, identifying crucial gaps in understanding, and laying out the challenges of achieving 
informed and shared decision making (i.e., decision making in which patients comprehend 
the relevant facts and share authority with healthcare providers). Our secondary goal is to 
relate current research to the major theoretical frameworks that explain and predict decision 
making to encourage hypothesis-driven research that builds on prior knowledge.
The outline of our article is as follows: We begin by describing different kinds of decisions 
along the cancer continuum from prevention (before a cancer has developed) to end-of-life 
(after curative options have been exhausted). Next, we discuss why people are not optimal 
decision makers, including instability of preferences, heuristics and biases, difficulties with 
affective forecasting and widespread deficiencies in numeracy (the ability to use and 
understand numbers, such as risks and probabilities). As part of this discussion, we examine 
the implications of these findings for theories of decision making. Then, we review research 
on the effectiveness of aids to improve decision making and, thus, improve health outcomes 
including emotional outcomes such as worry. In closing, we identify specific challenges and 
open questions that pertain to each of these aspects of decision making about cancer: what 
people make decisions about, how they decide, and how such decisions can be improved.
Decisions along the Cancer Continuum
The cancer continuum--prevention, screening, diagnosis, treatment, survivorship, and end of 
life--is a useful heuristic for thinking about cancer decisions because each phase has its own 
challenges. At the earliest phase--prevention--people face decisions with implications for 
cancer that occur far in the future, if they occur at all for a given individual. Nevertheless, 
half of all cancers could be prevented if individuals adopted healthy lifestyle behaviors, such 
as eating a healthy diet, eliminating tobacco use, and following recommended cancer 
screening and immunization guidelines (e.g., immunizing for hepatitis B to prevent liver 
cancer) (Green, Williams, Logan, & Strutton, 2010; Stein & Colditz 2004).
Adopting and maintaining these behaviors usually require an ongoing series of decisions 
carried out repeatedly over time. For example, smokers wishing to quit may have to 
reevaluate their decision to abstain multiple times a day. According to standard decision 
theory, people evaluate outcomes experienced with a new behavior, and determine whether 
the behavior warrants continuing, which is a challenge when outcomes, such as cancer 
prevention, are long-term (Rothman, 2000).
Like prevention, screening to detect cancer (or the risk of cancer) occurs before symptoms 
appear. Screening encompasses physical examination (e.g., clinical breast examination), 
laboratory tests (e.g., a blood test for prostate specific antigen [PSA]), imaging procedures 
(e.g., mammography), and genetic tests (e.g., BRCA1/2 mutations). Decisions about 
screening can be complicated by uncertainty about its benefits in prolonging life and the 
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difficulty of weighing potential benefits and harms, such as harms following false positive 
results and overdiagnosis.
For example, because screening mammography in women aged 40 to 49 years was judged to 
have only a small net benefit, as of 2009, the United States Preventive Services Task Force 
(USPSTF) no longer recommended routine testing in this age group. However, they 
acknowledged that this decision “should be an individual one and take patient context into 
account, including the patient’s values regarding specific benefits and harms.” This change 
in screening recommendations for young women continues to be controversial (Webb et al., 
2013), as was the later USPSTF decision to recommend against PSA screening, described as 
a “controversy that will not die” (Barry, 2009; see also Chou et al., 2011; Hartzband & 
Groopman, 2012; McNaughton-Collins & Barry, 2011; Moyer, 2012). According to 
standard decision theory, the usefulness of screening depends on the base rate of a disease 
(e.g., breast cancer prevalence is low for women in their 40’s), the accuracy of the screening 
test, and the efficacy of treatment should cancer be detected.
Treatment decisions are complicated not only by uncertainty about their effectiveness and 
the balance of benefits and harms, but by multiple potential outcomes that patients must 
consider. As the number and type of cancer treatment options have increased, patients and 
physicians face increasingly complex decisions. A patient may wish to weigh the costs and 
benefits of treatments with respect to duration of symptom-free survival, time spent with 
toxicity due to treatment, time to relapse, and impact on quality of life and functional status.
For example, active surveillance for men with prostate cancer involves invasive procedures, 
including PSA tests, digital rectal examinations, ultrasounds, and prostate biopsies 
(Cooperberg, Carrol, & Klotz, 2011; Tosoian et al., 2011). Although men who elect active 
surveillance avoid side-effects of treatment, the psychological effect of living with the fear 
of cancer progression may create undue anxiety (van den Bergh, Korfage, & Bangma, 
2012). This fear may explain why the vast majority of men with low-risk prostate cancer 
elect active treatment with surgery or radiotherapy, despite the risk of significant side-effects 
(Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, & Ubel, 2005).
Another important consideration involves the potential for long-term and delayed effects of 
treatment. For example, breast cancer patients considering adjuvant chemotherapy may be 
concerned about “chemobrain” and how cognitive dysfunction could affect future work and 
family life (Ganz, 2012). (Adjuvant therapy is given after primary therapy to increase the 
chance of long-term survival.) Patients may also have to decide about fertility preservation, 
a choice that sometimes must be made for children or adolescents, affecting future quality of 
life (Quinn et al., 2011).
Complicating these decisions, unaided affective forecasting, the ability to anticipate 
emotions and preferences, is poor for adults (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) and even worse for 
children and adolescents (Nisker, Baylis, & McLeod, 2006; Reyna, Chapman, Dougherty, & 
Confrey, 2012). However, recent proposals to involve minors more in medical decision 
making, such as those about future fertility, have begun to build on developmental research 
in decision making (Wilhelms & Reyna, 2013). Also, as we discuss below, the purpose of 
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decision aids is to help patients of all ages to better forecast their futures so that they can 
make informed decisions.
Cancer patients at the end of life face some of the most complex and difficult decisions of 
all. They must first recognize that they are entering the end-of-life—an emotionally 
challenging prognosis that is confounded by uncertainty—and then decide whether to pursue 
palliative rather than curative or life-sustaining goals. If they elect palliative care, they are 
then faced with deciding among a variety of interventions to ameliorate symptoms. As 
patients transition from curative to palliative care, they must decide where they want to 
spend their final days—at home, in hospice, in a nursing home, or a hospital. With the 
emphasis on advance-care planning at the end of life, patients are asked to make difficult 
decisions early in the course of illness, well before death is imminent. Although this effort is 
ethically justified, it is also psychologically daunting given the difficulty of imagining 
unfamiliar and dreadful health states, and formulating values and preferences for these 
outcomes. Therefore, decision research that shapes the context of these choices (e.g., by 
providing default options; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), and decision aids grounded in such 
research, have enormous potential to alleviate suffering, reduce uncertainty, and ensure that 
patients’ wishes are followed about one of life’s most crucial decisions.
Summary and Implications
Ideally, decisions along the cancer continuum should be based on a full understanding of the 
benefits, harms, and uncertainties associated with alternative courses of action—an essential 
part of informed decision making (IDM; Rimer, Briss, Zeller, Chan, & Woolf, 2004). As the 
examples we presented illustrate, this ideal is difficult to achieve in cancer care, despite its 
ethical desirability. Cancer decisions often involve concepts that are hard to grasp, such as 
health risks and probabilities, technical medical information that is unfamiliar to most 
patients, and a multiplicity of options that can be overwhelming, especially in the context of 
emotions, such as fear. In addition, decisions about prevention, screening, and treatment 
have repercussions for future quality of life, which is difficult to forecast. These challenges 
that are inherent in cancer decisions are compounded by the psychological limitations of 
individuals, which we explore in greater depth in the next section. The good news is that 
decision research offers insight into these challenges and limitations, with implications for 
how they can be addressed.
Why People Are Not Optimal Decision Makers
In this section, we provide an overview of heuristics and biases that characterize decision 
making and explain how people respond to information about benefits, risks, and 
uncertainties. To begin, whereas uncertainty is a feature of decision making that is relevant 
across the cancer continuum (as we have discussed), a large body of research has shown that 
people find uncertainty aversive (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). All factors equal, 
people prefer a sure or safe option over a risky one (known as “risk aversion”), sometimes 
so much so that they choose suboptimal treatments because they are perceived to be less 
“risky” (e.g., Fraenkel et al., 2012). People also have a preference against options involving 
unknown (ambiguous) vs. known probabilities, and respond to ambiguity by forming 
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pessimistic judgments of risk and avoiding decision making—a response known as 
“ambiguity aversion” (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 1961).
Ambiguity aversion has been demonstrated in multiple decision-making domains including 
cancer care. For example, the use of confidence intervals to communicate imprecision in risk 
estimates leads to elevated perceptions of environmental and health risks (Kuhn, 1997; 
Viscusi, 1997) as well as cancer risk (Han et al., 2011). Perceptions of ambiguity are 
associated with fatalistic perceptions about cancer prevention (Han et al., 2007; Han, Moser, 
& Klein, 2006), and the communication of ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of health-
protective measures (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Viscusi, 1997), including cancer screening tests 
(Frosch, Kaplan, & Felitti, 2003; Volk, Spann, Cass, & Hawley, 2003), makes people less 
willing to adopt them. Nevertheless, ambiguity aversion is not a universal phenomenon; 
many people are ambiguity-indifferent or even ambiguity-seeking (Camerer & Weber, 
1992), and some circumstances may promote ambiguity tolerance. For example, advanced 
cancer patients facing limited treatment options may view ambiguity about the expected 
benefits of treatment as a source of hope—suggesting greater outcome variability and the 
chance that a given individual could “beat the odds” (Gould, 1985; Innes & Payne, 2009).
Most scholars agree that IDM is more than uptake of information about benefits, risks, and 
uncertainties, however. Informed decisions should also be concordant with individuals’ 
values and preferences (Rimer et al., 2004; USPSTF, 2009). The emphasis on patients 
knowing their values and preferences has increased because they are now in the driver’s 
seat. That is, a growing movement referred to as “shared” or “patient-centered” decision 
making (SDM) places more responsibility for decisions on patients, in interaction with their 
providers (Kaplan, 2004). Especially under conditions of “equipoise”—when the benefits of 
an intervention do not clearly outweigh the harms or the strength of the evidence supporting 
an intervention is limited by substantial scientific uncertainty—the patient’s values and 
preferences should be the determining factor in decisions (Elwyn, Frosch, & Rollnick, 
2009).
According to standard decision theory, patient’s choices reveal their values and preferences. 
However, heuristics (mental shortcuts) and cognitive biases produce inconsistent choices, 
making it difficult to infer values and preferences. Indeed, contrary to standard theory, some 
scholars hold that “true” preferences often do not exist (Peters, Klein, Kaufman, Meillur, & 
Dixon, in press). In this view, rather than having preformed, stable values and preferences, 
people construct them in the moment of decision making, based on the available cues. When 
the cues change, choices change, producing inconsistency.
For example, consider choosing between surgeries for colon cancer, each of which has an 
80% cure rate without complications (Amsterlaw, Zikmund-Fisher, Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2006). 
An additional 4% of the people who have Surgery 1 survive but experience complications 
(1% colostomy, 1% chronic diarrhea, 1% bowel obstruction, and 1% wound infection); the 
remaining 16% die. In contrast, 20% of people who have Surgery 2 die. Although more than 
90% of people surveyed preferred living with each of the complications over death, 49% 
chose Surgery 2 over 1. Clearly, this set of preferences is inconsistent. Many people who 
chose the surgery without complications chose it despite preferring life with complications 
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over death. Effects such as this one, as well as many others exemplifying inconsistent 
preferences (e.g., framing effects, when treatment preferences shift depending on whether 
risks are described in terms of rates of mortality vs. survival; McNeil, Pauker, & Tversky, 
1988), have prompted the inference that people do not have stable preferences.
Responses to the same numerical risk estimates also vary depending on the context of other 
numbers, a well-known perceptual comparison effect (i.e., the perceived magnitude of a 
stimulus depends on the magnitudes of other stimuli being evaluated; Windschitl, Martin, & 
Flugstad, 2002). These contextual effects are common in patients’ evaluation of risks of 
cancer treatments (Zikmund-Fisher, Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2010). For example, when comparing 
adjuvant therapies to prevent cancer recurrence, presenting the same increments in survival 
simultaneously as opposed to sequentially produced different preferences for therapy 
(Zikmund-Fisher, Angott, & Ubel, 2011).
Similarly, cutting the risk of recurrent breast cancer from 6% to 3% over five years with 
adjuvant therapy was viewed differently depending on whether the average risk was 
described as 3% versus 12% (Fagerlin et al., 2007). Specifically, women who were told that 
3% is the average risk worried more about their greater-than-average 6% risk, whereas those 
told that 12% is the average risk were less worried about their lower-then-average 6% risk 
(Fagerlin et al., 2007). Not surprisingly, women in the 3% group were more motivated to 
undergo adjuvant therapy and were more convinced about its effectiveness, compared to 
those in the 12% group. In another study, patients given personalized risk estimates felt that 
those risks were high when they learned about the lowest risk levels for other women of 
their age and race (Lipkus et al., 2001). In addition, comparative information about average 
risk (which compares favorably to typical overestimation of personal risk) has been shown 
to reduce willingness to screen for cancer (see Fagerlin et al., 2005). Thus, elicited values, 
preferences, and risk perceptions about cancer fluctuate depending on the context of 
comparison.
These kinds of fluctuations in elicited judgments are more pronounced among people low in 
numeracy (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann., 2009). Those who are low in numeracy rely 
more on non-numerical information in decision making and are more susceptible to 
heuristics and biases, exhibiting more inconsistent values and preferences (e.g., Peters, 
McCaul, Stefanek, & Nelson, 2006). Although most scholars agree that numbers expressing 
the magnitudes of risks and of treatment outcomes should be provided to patients to achieve 
informed consent (Fischhoff, Brewer, & Downs, 2012), low numeracy is prevalent. More 
than 193 million Americans in a representative survey lacked the quantitative proficiency 
needed for ordinary health-related tasks, such as calculating medication dosage for a child 
based on weight (Reyna et al., 2009). Hence, many patients cannot take advantage of the 
kind of numerical information needed for fully informed decision making.
As expected, complicated comparisons, such as those involved in adjuvant therapy, are 
particularly difficult for those lower in numeracy. Zikmund-Fisher, Fagerlin, and Ubel 
(2008) showed that about half of respondents to a survey could answer what they referred to 
as the most critical question about adjuvant therapy after viewing the standard risk 
information presentation using horizontal bars that compared four therapy options. The 
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question was about incremental risk reduction achieved by adding adjuvant chemotherapy to 
hormonal therapy. The percentage of respondents correctly noting that two fewer women out 
of 100 would die--if they took chemotherapy combined with hormonal therapy--was 
improved by presenting a simpler two-option pictograph, but large differences remained for 
those differing in numeracy: For those higher in numeracy, 85% answered correctly with the 
two-option pictograph versus 62% with the four-option bar graph; for those lower in 
numeracy, 69% answered correctly with the two-option pictograph, compared to 43% with 
the four-option bar graph.
As we discuss below in the section on decision aids, values clarification methods (VCM) are 
designed to reduce the impact of these cognitive problems by helping people deliberate 
about the attributes of options (e.g., risks) and how they map onto personal values. However, 
expert panels who have reviewed the literature have concluded that decision aids in general, 
and values clarification methods in particular, are not grounded in theory (e.g., Fagerlin et 
al., in press). Therefore, these efforts to aid decision making are based on findings taken at 
face value or assumptions about decision processes, rather than scientifically established 
underlying mechanisms. We now turn to these mechanisms in order to better understand 
how to explain, predict, and improve decision making about cancer.
Theories of Decision Making: Classical, Computational, Psychophysical 
and Dual-Process Approaches
The major mechanisms posited to explain decision making, in roughly chronological order 
of their emergence in the literature, fall roughly into five theoretical types: classical, 
computational (Simon, 1956), psychophysical (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), dual processes 
of cognition versus emotion (or experience, Epstein, 1994), and fuzzy-trace theory’s (FTT’s) 
dual verbatim-gist representations, retrieval variability of values, and processing interference 
among overlapping event classes (Reyna, 2008). Elements of each of these approaches are 
reflected in current models of health decision making (e.g., Peters, 2012; Reyna, 2012b; 
Zikmund-Fisher, 2013).
As Simon (1956) pointed out, classical decision theory requires processing the probabilities 
and outcomes of all relevant options to make optimal choices, and a necessary condition for 
such optimality is that preferences be consistent. As we have discussed, however, actual 
choices are not optimal and preferences are not consistent. Therefore, Simon proposed a 
computational account of decision making that recognized people’s information-processing 
limitations. Because of these limitations, people satisficed (or took mental shortcuts) rather 
than optimized.
To account for specific inconsistencies in preferences for risk, prospect theory was 
developed as a psychological account that distinguished between what people ought to do, 
described in classical theory, and what people actually do (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
Prospect theory explained why increases in survival (gains) are not subjectively equivalent 
to decreases in mortality (losses), even when they are objectively equivalent. The theory 
built on the psychophysical functions of classical theory that translate objective quantities 
(e.g., years of life gained or lost) into subjective values, but with a steeper slope for losses 
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than gains. Exact functions that translate objective into subjective values have been debated, 
but the basic idea that quantities are not perceived linearly (i.e., a constant numerical 
difference is not perceived consistently) has been upheld in many studies. For example, in 
the Amsterlaw et al. (2006) study presented earlier, people seem to view a 0% versus 4% 
difference in complication rates as significant, but dismiss an equally-sized difference in 
death rates of 16% versus 20% as negligible.
A major criticism of the computational and psychophysical approaches, however, has been 
that they did not incorporate emotion (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). For 
example, when presentation formats equated numbers in the Amsterlaw et al. (2006) 
example by comparing 40 out of 1000 patients with complications (Surgery 1) to 40 out of 
1000 who die from scar tissue (Surgery 2), in addition to the 160 who die from colon cancer 
for both surgeries, 40% of people still preferred Surgery 2, a preference that was ascribed to 
emotion (e.g., see Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2010). In other words, complications such as 
colostomies and chronic diarrhea, as in the Amsterlaw et al. (2006) example, are assumed to 
elicit emotional responses that are at odds with the cognitive responses elicited by directly 
comparing each of these complications separately with death. Supporting the role of emotion 
in cancer decision making, as noted earlier in connection with the Fagerlin et al. (2007) 
study, women’s worry reflected their subjective perceptions of risk as relatively low or high, 
despite being presented with objectively identical numerical values of 6% risk in different 
conditions of that study.
Dual-process approaches capture this conflict between emotion and cognition, sometimes 
characterized as experiential versus cognitive or System 1 versus 2 (Epstein, 1994; Peters, 
Lipkus, & Diefenbach, 2006). Zikmund-Fisher et al. (2010, p. S89) characterize the contrast 
as between “weighing risks and benefits [as in classical, computational, or psychophysical 
approaches] versus weighing feelings” (see also Peters et al., 2006). People experience 
integral emotions about cancer, notably fear, anger, and sadness, but they also experience 
incidental emotions, which arise in unrelated situations and carry over to health contexts. 
Incidental emotions are irrelevant (by definition) to health decisions, but these emotions 
have been shown to shape risk perceptions, especially for those low in numeracy for whom 
numerical expressions of risk have little meaning (Peters, 2012).
In sum, classical, computational, and psychophysical approaches to decision theory 
emphasize trading off of harms, benefits, and uncertainties (e.g., Brewer & Rimer, 2008). 
Thus, if the risks of screening are low and the benefits are high, these approaches predict 
that people would choose screening—with caveats based on such mediators as self-efficacy, 
perceived control, or perceived barriers (e.g., Brewer, Chapman, et al., 2007; Fishbein, 
2008; Prochaska, 2008). However, these approaches have been criticized as too cognitive; 
they omit emotion as an explicit factor in decision making (Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
McCaul, Peters, Nelson, & Stefanek, 2005).
Addressing this gap, dual-process models initially emphasized opposing effects of cognition 
and emotion. For example, in addition to the examples mentioned earlier of opposing effects 
of cognition and emotion, Rini et al. (2009) contrasted cognitive versus emotional effects on 
decisional conflict after patients received an ambiguous (indeterminate) BRCA1/2 test result 
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(the BRCA 1/2 test identifies genetic mutations that increase breast and ovarian cancer risk): 
Cognitive factors (health beliefs) were more important in predicting decisional conflict one 
month after test disclosure, but emotional factors were more important one year later. 
Summarizing the literature, Zikmund-Fisher et al. (2010) concluded that emotions are often 
more influential than factual knowledge in decision making about cancer treatments and 
prevention.
Beyond Opposing Dual Processes of Cognition versus Emotion
We have thus far emphasized contrasting effects of emotion versus cognition, which have 
been used in the past to justify assuming that there are dual processes in decision making. 
However, current theories generally acknowledge that emotion and cognition can be 
complementary (e.g., Wood & Bechara, in press, and see below). That is, integral and 
incidental emotions need not conflict with objective appraisals of risk or other health-related 
valuations, and can facilitate decision making. For example, the fact that anger increases risk 
taking (as predicted by the appraisal tendency framework, ATF) may benefit a decision 
maker when the option associated with the best medical outcome is risky, as is the case with 
some treatments for cancer (Ferrer, Klein, Lerner, Reyna, & Keltner, 2013). Although the 
ATF is not a theory of decision making per se, it augments dual-process approaches by 
supplying specific mechanisms with which to understand how decisions may benefit from, 
or be hindered by, discrete emotions (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Lerner & Tiedens, 
2006).
Although the likely effects of emotion on cancer decision making—good and bad—are 
undeniable given the extant literature, some important effects are attributed to emotion that, 
instead, may be cognitive in origin. Surprisingly few studies have manipulated emotions 
experimentally to determine their effects on risk perceptions (but see Johnson & Tversky, 
1983, for an exception). The affect heuristic, for example, has been invoked to explain such 
effects as judging risk as larger when it is described using frequencies (e.g., “Of every 100 
patients similar to Mr. Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act of violence…after 
discharge”) compared with describing the same risk using percentages (10% in our example; 
Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). However, there is little evidence that this 
effect is affective or emotional other than that more vivid images are reported in the 
frequency than in the percentage conditions. Naturally, more vivid imagery could be the 
result of a higher perception of risk of violence, as opposed to a cause of a higher perception 
of risk of violence. Indeed, this frequency-percentage effect is easily explained by prior 
theories of denominator neglect that have been tested with experimental designs (the 
denominator of 100 is neglected relative to the numerator of 10 in the frequency 
formulation, but 10% has no explicit denominator to neglect; Reyna, 2004).
Similarly, the Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole’s (1995) ratio-bias finding has been attributed to 
affective or emotional responses (e.g., Peters et al., 2006; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2010), but 
is predicted by cognitive theory without appealing to affect or emotion (e.g., Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1994, 2008). The ratio-bias effect is that people “feel” that a bowl with 9 red jelly 
beans out of 100 gave them a better chance of winning because it contained a larger number 
of red beans, despite “knowing” that a bowl of 1 red bean out of 10 gave them the best 
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chance of winning. Treatment decisions involving survival and mortality rates are subject to 
this ratio-bias effect (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2009). (The ratio bias has also been 
called the “numerosity effect” because the relative numerosity of numerators, 9 versus 1 in 
our jelly beans example, takes precedence over the ratio of numerators to denominators; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1994). Although the ratio-bias result is a critical prediction of cognitive-
experiential theory (Epstein, 1994), valid and reliable measures of cognitive versus 
experiential thinking repeatedly failed to correctly predict this bias, raising doubts about the 
affective explanation (for a review of evidence, see Reyna & Brainerd, 2008).
Thus, in addition to bona fide effects of emotion that must be captured by theory, cognition 
is sometimes sufficient to explain effects attributed to emotion and other times it produces 
an emotional response that, in turn, influences decision making (e.g., Reyna, 2008; Reyna & 
Rivers, 2008). Past criticisms of cognitive approaches were directed at classical, 
computational, or psychophysical theories, but these specific criticisms do not apply to 
newer representational or meaning-based cognitive approaches that incorporate emotion and 
motivation (for a review of newer theories, see Reyna & Rivers, 2008).
Distinguishing among theoretical mechanisms in specific instances (e.g., whether cognitive 
or emotional factors, or both, explain an effect) is important for understanding and 
facilitating cancer decision making. To illustrate, Schnur, DiLorenzo, Montgomery, Erblich, 
Winkel, Hall, & Bovbjerg (2006) found that an observed relationship between family history 
and prostate cancer worry was fully mediated by perceived prostate cancer risk. A reversed 
causation model, in which worry led to increased perceived risk, was a poor fit to the data. 
In other words, these results are consistent with perceived risk (a cognitive factor) causing 
worry (an affective or emotional factor) rather than the other way around. These results 
suggest that reducing worry or anxiety may not always be a suitable goal for decision aids 
(e.g., better to target perceived risk in order to reduce worry, according to this study). In 
fact, based on a review of the literature on decision aids, Bekker, Legare, Tracey, O’Connor, 
& Lemyre, (2003) concluded that moderate levels of anxiety may facilitate effective 
decision strategies about screening and treatment.
Rather than viewing cognition and emotion as opposing processes, current dual-process 
theories generally take an integrative approach (Peters, 2012; Reyna, 2012b; Schmiege, 
Bryan, & Klein, 2009; Vries, Fagerlin, Witteman, & Scherer, 2013; Zikmund-Fisher, 2013). 
We have already discussed many assumptions of these theories, but we now briefly 
introduce FTT, which brings together concepts concerning mental representation (verbatim 
vs. gist), emotion, social and moral values, and class-inclusion confusion (reflected in ratio 
bias, the frequency-percentage effect, and misunderstanding of conditional probabilities, 
such as the probability of a BRCA mutation conditional on having had breast cancer).
An Alternative Dual-process Approach: Fuzzy-trace Theory
FTT is a dual-process approach that has been applied to a wide array of health and medical 
decisions, including cancer decision making (e.g., Brewer, Richman, DeFrank, Reyna, & 
Carey, 2012; Dawson, Johnson, & Luke, 2012; Hutton, Belkora, Shacter, & Moore, 2009; 
Reyna, 2008; Reyna, Lloyd, & Whalen, 2001). The theory’s predictions have been tested in 
many experiments with diverse populations, and its assumptions have been formalized in 
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mathematical models of memory, judgment, and decision making (Kühberger & Tanner, 
2010; for overviews, see Reyna, 2012a; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; 2011). The theory builds 
on prior approaches, but, unlike those approaches, it distinguishes two kinds of mental 
representations of information: verbatim and gist.
Verbatim representations are encoded in parallel with gist and capture the surface form of 
information—the exact words, numbers, or pictures. This precise form of representation 
lends itself to supporting precise analysis, such as rote computation (e.g., dividing exact 
numbers mechanically, regardless of their meaning or relevance to the task; Liberali, Reyna, 
Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2011; Peters et al., 2006; Reyna et al., 2009). In contrast, gist 
representations capture the essential meaning of information, which is shaped by emotion, 
knowledge, culture, context and worldview among other factors. Gist representations 
support the fuzzy, parallel, usually unconscious processes of intuition (defined as in the 
foundations of mathematics). Evidence for specific kinds of gist representations and for 
specific types of processing (e.g., unconscious use of gist) has been gathered by testing 
models of numerical and verbal information processing (e.g., Reyna, 2012a; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995).
Typical gist representations of information that are used in medical decision making include: 
(1) categorical gist (e.g., safe vs. risky; save some lives vs. no lives); (2) ordinal gist (e.g., 
low vs. high risk; save more lives vs. fewer lives); and (3) linear-ordering gist that integrates 
multiple items and roughly orders them (e.g., toward the low vs. high end of risk among a 
set of medications; localized “in situ” cancer vs. stages of metastasizing to other organs) 
(e.g., Brewer et al., 2012; Fraenkel, et al., 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Applying these 
distinctions among representations (e.g., categorical possibility, ordinal or relative 
possibility, absolute or verbatim probability) that were introduced in laboratory tasks 
involving probability judgment and decision making, Zikmund-Fisher (2013) illustrates how 
such mental representations apply more broadly to medical decision making.
Thus, when presented with any meaningful information (e.g., on the Web or in a doctor’s 
office), people routinely extract the gist of individual items (e.g., words or numbers), 
combinations of items (sentences and inferences), and extended narratives. A major 
difference between gist and alternative verbatim representations is that gist captures a 
functionally significant bottom line that integrates and interprets information, often through 
causal inferences, as opposed to being a list of arbitrary facts.
As can be gleaned from this discussion, the definition of gist in FTT differs sharply from the 
traditional definition of heuristics as “strategies that ignore information to make decisions 
faster, more frugally, and/or more accurately than more complex methods” (p. 453, 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Gist is not defined simply as processing less information. 
Gist involves understanding meaning (insight in the gestalt sense)--integrating dimensions 
of information to distill its essence, not just processing fewer dimensions of information that 
are “good enough” (Reyna, 2013). The degree of insight captured in a gist representation 
depends on specific characteristics of the individual (e.g., background knowledge; Reyna, 
Chick, Corbin, & Hsia, 2013; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006).
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Although people encode verbatim and gist representations, they generally have a fuzzy 
processing (gist) preference for familiar information; they begin with the simplest level of 
qualitative representations—categorical—but engage more precise representations (e.g., 
ordinal, such as lower vs. higher risk) if that is required to discriminate options. (Zikmund-
Fisher’s, 2013, taxonomy of appropriate levels of precision in patient risk communication 
corresponds to FTT’s concepts of hierarchies of gist and task calibration; see Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1994; 1995.) Thus, the categorical possibility of a bad outcome tends to produce 
risk aversion (preference for safer options), all other factors equal, because people do not 
precisely trade off risks and benefits; they encode tradeoffs, but decide based on gist, such as 
a categorical possibility.
Once options are represented, people retrieve relevant values and principles, such as social 
norms and moral principles (e.g., for health, family, saving lives, and so on; Fukukura, 
Ferguson, & Fujita, 2012; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). According to FTT and consistent with 
evidence, values are stored in long-term memory as vague gists and retrieved, as opposed to 
constructed. Retrieval is variable because it depends on cues or reminders (even when 
values are deeply held; for one detailed retrieval model, see Brainerd, Reyna, & Aydin, 
2010). When retrieved, people apply these values and principles to the gist representations 
of their options to produce choices (Reyna, 2004; 2012b). Thus, choice variability stems 
from changes in wording that evoke different mental representations (e.g., the gist of “some 
survive” differs from that of “some die” even when they refer to the same objective 
number), differences in retrieval cues for values and principles, and difficulties associated 
with mapping stored values onto representations of information. Each of these factors—
representation of options, retrieval of values or principles, and mapping of values onto 
representations of options—accounts for unique variance in decision making (e.g., Reyna, 
Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003).
For example, some asymptomatic low-risk people have been found to be averse to screening 
for cancer because the gist of the options for them boils down to “being okay,” which is the 
status quo, versus “getting screened and discovering either that one is okay or not okay.” 
Because cued values favor being okay over not being okay, they prefer to not be screened 
(Reyna, 2008; 2012b). In this view, the line between “okay” and “not okay” in a patient 
without cancer is ultimately psychological (although objective information figures into the 
determination of this threshold). According to this explanation, patients who view the risks 
of screening as non-nil (i.e., as taking “some risk” of being “not okay”) mentally cross a 
categorical line between being “okay” to potentially being “not okay” as their status quo in 
order to choose screening.
The application of values/principles to representations can be disrupted by noise, strong 
emotion, or forms of cognitive interference, such as partially overlapping or nested classes 
in probability judgments—called class-inclusion interference (Reyna, 1991; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2008). For example, the class of people with genetic risks overlaps with the class 
of people who have (or will develop) the disease of invasive breast cancer. For Huntington’s 
disease, the overlap is complete; having the genetic mutation means that the disease will 
develop and vice versa. This class structure is easy to process (Reyna et al., 2001). The 
partially overlapping class structure for BRCA 1/2 mutation is difficult to process (e.g., 
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Hanoch, Miron-Shatz, & Himmelstein, 2010): Most people with breast cancer do not have 
the mutation, but most people with the mutation develop breast cancer, a confusing 
relationship. According to FTT, this confusion results in denominator neglect as people 
focus on target classes, neglecting the more inclusive classes in which targets are contained. 
Interventions designed to segregate overlapping classes reduce denominator neglect, thereby 
considerably reducing biases and fallacies in probability judgment, a beneficial effect 
demonstrated in subjects ranging from students to physicians (e.g., Lloyd & Reyna, 2001; 
Wolfe & Reyna, 2010).
The topic of emotion is no longer neglected in most modern theories of decision making. 
Research on FTT and on emotion have been integrated, for example, in the concept of 
“emotional gist” (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Rivers, Reyna, & 
Mills, 2008; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2010; see also affective meaning, Peters, 2012). 
“Emotional gist” is a mental representation that incorporates emotion as part of meaning. 
Emotion can be further specified in terms of mood or the valence of content, which have 
distinct effects on how information is processed. For example, negative mood produces 
greater attention to verbatim details (e.g., cancer worry was associated with greater attention 
to details; Beckjord, Finney Rutten, Arora, Moser & Hesse, 2008), whereas negative content 
produces greater attention to gist (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008; Rivers et al., 2008). As 
discussed early in the development of FTT (grounded in the pioneering work of Zajonc, 
1980, and Isen, 1997), valence (good-bad) is a simple gist. Memory for valence is retained 
over long periods, supporting the conclusion that it is represented as gist (if valence were 
represented in verbatim memory, it would fade quickly). That is, the emotional essence of an 
experience is retained and, as models of recall show, can be used later to reconstruct details 
(Gomes, Brainerd, & Stein, 2013; Reyna, 2011). Valence, and also discrete emotions (e.g., 
fear, anger, happiness, and so forth), act as organizing themes for recalling the past and 
extrapolating to the future (Rivers et al., 2008).
Decision Support in Cancer Care
Thus far, we have reviewed cancer decisions across the continuum from prevention to end-
of life, heuristics and biases that make decisions inconsistent, and theoretical explanations of 
the mechanisms of those decisions. This discussion has touched on research about cognition, 
emotion, social values and principles, and IDM. In the following section, we review research 
on decision support, namely, how evidence-based practices can facilitate decision making 
about cancer. Although decision support includes training of providers, counseling and 
training of patients, and use of patient decision aids, we focus on aids because they have the 
largest and strongest evidence base. As we noted earlier and is evident from our review, 
most decision support has been designed without specific grounding in theory. In the section 
that follows, we discuss how these literatures can inform one another and the challenges of 
improving decisions relevant to cancer.
Cancer-Related Decisions are Complex and Can Benefit from Decision Support
Prevention and treatment of cancer are particularly good targets for decision support for 
several reasons. First, as noted earlier, cancer accounts for a significant amount of morbidity 
and mortality. Second, fear of cancer is high among the general public and perception of 
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cancer risk often exceeds its true level. Third, the options for cancer prevention, screening, 
and treatment are growing in number and complexity. That is, as we have discussed, 
differences among options may be uncertain and difficult to understand for the average 
patient.
In addition, because cancer diagnoses, or fear of a cancer diagnosis, produce considerable 
emotional impact, as we have also discussed, decision-making processes are likely to be 
affected. Also, cancer decision making often requires affective forecasting about unfamiliar 
courses of action and is subject to heuristics and biases (see “Why People Are Not Optimal 
Decision Makers”). Finally, cancer remains a taboo subject for many patients, and 
discussion of cancer-related treatment options may be difficult for patients and providers 
alike. Thus, having support for cancer-related decision making can be particularly 
beneficial.
Cancer-Related Decision Aids have been Developed and/or Evaluated for Efficacy
Many decision aids are available, but fewer have been evaluated in efficacy or effectiveness 
trials. A search of the Ottawa Decision Aid inventory (http://decisionaid.ohri.ca) using the 
key word “cancer” identified 47 different decision aids on cancer screening, prevention, and 
treatment topics. The most recent Cochrane review of decision aids identified 86 trials: 
cancer-related decisions were examined in 38 of the 86 trials (44%). Prevention or screening 
decisions were most common (n=29) with fewer trials examining treatment (n=8) or 
survivorship issues (n=1). The most common decision addressed was PSA screening (n=11); 
colon cancer screening was addressed in 5 studies (Stacey et al., 2011). Notably, most of the 
decision aids identified in the search of the Ottawa database have not been evaluated in 
randomized trials; conversely, many of the decision aids tested in trials were not identified 
in the Ottawa database.
Decision Aids Improve Some Decision Making Outcomes
The full Cochrane review found decision aids (for all topics) to be effective in improving 
knowledge, creating more realistic outcome expectations, reducing decisional conflict and 
uncertainty, and possibly improving physician-patient communication, compared with no 
decision aid. Health outcomes did not appear to be affected; adherence and cost outcomes 
were too few in number to be evaluated (Stacey et al., 2011).
Results for cancer-specific decisions were not examined as a separate group. However, the 
Cochrane reviewers found that those receiving a PSA decision aid were less likely to receive 
screening than those receiving usual care (RR 0.85, 95% CI 0.74, 0.98) (Stacey et al., 2011). 
For colon cancer screening, the effect of decision aid use on screening was mixed, and the 
summary estimate of effect imprecise (RR 1.20, 95% CI 0.90, 1.61). There were too few 
trials to draw firm conclusions about the effects of decision support on cancer surgical 
options. One trial found no effect on preferences for adjuvant chemotherapy in breast cancer 
(Whelan et al., 2003). Thus, it appears from the recent Cochrane review that decision aids 
generally improve decision-related outcomes (knowledge, risk perception, decisional 
conflict), but the effects on more distal outcomes are mixed or uncertain, due to a relatively 
small number of trials.
Reyna et al. Page 14













Specific Elements of Decision Aids that Produce Improved Outcomes are not Clear
Many questions remain about which elements should be included in decision aids. On the 
one hand, developers of decision aids want to provide all the information and tools that a 
patient may need, such as values clarification tools. On the other hand, too much 
information may overwhelm or confuse the patient (particularly in the case of a new cancer 
diagnosis), risks the possibility that the patient will miss the key information while sorting 
through less important information, and may make the decision aid difficult to administer in 
clinical practice (Peters, Klein, Kaufman, Meilleur, & Dixon, in press; see also Bastardi & 
Shafir, 1998).
Despite guidelines for decision aid development and evaluation (Elwyn et al., 2006), the 
decision to include or exclude certain elements in decision aids typically requires empirical 
testing, as prior research and expert opinion could support either decision. As an example, 
one question that arose in the development of a colon cancer screening decision aid was 
whether the option of “no screening” should be offered as a “legitimate” choice. The 
investigators conducted a trial in which patients were randomized to view a decision aid 
with or without a segment in which the option of no screening was discussed (in a balanced 
manner). The proportion of viewers interested in screening did not differ, but the version 
without the “no screening” option was perceived as more favorable towards screening and 
clearer (Griffith, Fichter, Fowler, Lewis, & Pignone 2008).
Another question is whether decision aids should include an explicit tool to help users 
consider their personal values and relate them to elements of the decision. These “values 
clarification tools” can include simple advice to “think about what aspects of this decision 
are most important to you” to explicit tasks such as rating, ranking, or even discrete choice 
experiments. A multi-disciplinary group (including VR and MP) reviewed the effect of 
including values clarification in decision aids and identified 13 trials that compared decision 
aids with or without explicit values clarification tools; of these 6 involved cancer-related 
topics (Pignone et al., 2012). Some studies suggested improvements in decision processes or 
outcomes, but overall there were no clear, consistent effects.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
Summary and Overview
As this survey of research shows, decisions across the cancer continuum tap processes that 
are subject to cognitive limitations, such as heuristics and biases, and these limitations are 
more evident for some concepts (e.g., risk and ambiguity) and for some individuals (e.g., 
people low in numeracy) than others. In addition, cognition and emotion can conflict, 
undermining optimal health outcomes (e.g., watchful waiting rather than prostate surgery in 
some older men with slow-growing cancers), but recent research has identified points of 
synergy, for instance, the potential effect of anger on lowering risk perceptions of needed 
treatments.
Theoretical and empirical advances suggest that decisions that ignore such emotional factors 
as anxiety and dread are likely to reduce patients’ quality of life. However, it is also true that 
patients can regret irrevocable decisions (e.g., surgery) made in a moment of panic, once 
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they have adapted to the initial news of cancer and dispassionately considered their options. 
Affective forecasting—the ability to forecast emotions into the future (especially in 
unfamiliar situations such as a cancer diagnosis)—is notoriously poor. Therefore, emotions 
are not an unalloyed “good,” the secret to wisdom in an overly intellectualized world, nor 
are they a factor that should be ignored in considering the best decision for a given patient. 
In fact, new concepts such as emotional gist suggest that IDM may someday take advantage 
of emotional processing to guide patients to better extrapolate from their past experience to 
foresee their affective future with cancer, facilitating their decision making. Research is 
urgently needed on the precise loci of interactions between emotion and cognition to 
improve cancer decision making.
Although empirical phenomena relevant to cancer decision making have informed theories, 
these evidence-based theories have not become the basis for decision aids, despite their clear 
relevance. In concert with other groups, we see this lack of theoretical grounding as a major 
shortcoming of decision aids, one that explains in large part why it is not known which 
elements of decision aids might be effective—and research should be focused on this 
problem. To that end, we briefly describe testable implications of a contemporary integrative 
theory of health and medical decision making.
Implications of FTT for Decision Support Interventions in Cancer Care
FTT has several important implications for the development of decision support 
interventions aimed at enabling IDM and SDM in cancer care. Above all, it suggests a 
different approach from interventions based on classical and traditional dual-process 
theories of decision making, which grant primacy to deliberative processing of precise 
quantitative (verbatim) information. Unlike these other approaches that stress an evenhanded 
list of detailed risks and benefits (e.g., listing the pros and cons of surgery as is typical for 
decisions aids), FTT suggests that decision support should strive to capture the essential 
bottom line of patients’ options, resolving tradeoffs to the degree that is possible. Decision 
support, therefore, should “begin with the end in mind” by identifying the key gists of the 
information to be conveyed, which can be obtained by surveying experts and experienced 
patients (Fraenkel et al., 2012).
Until recently, a common measure of risk perception has been to ask people for a number 
that corresponds to the probability that an adverse event would occur. “Understanding” risk 
was then measured as agreement between objective (or presented) numbers and reported 
numbers. Nowadays, applying the FTT distinction between verbatim versus gist measures of 
risk, investigators recognize the shortcomings of such verbatim measures (e.g., Gaissmaier, 
Skopec, Müller, Broschinski, & Politi, 2012; Hawley et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2009; Tait, 
Voepel-Lewis, Zikmund-Fisher, & Fagerlin, 2010; Tait, Zikmund-Fisher, Fagerlin, & 
Voepel-Lewis, 2010). Parroting back a numerical risk or reading a number off a bar graph 
without an appreciation of what the number means falls short of IDM (Peters, 2012; Reyna, 
2008; Reyna et al., 2009; Zikmund-Fisher, 2013).
In this view, IDM is not accomplished by recalling or recognizing rote facts (e.g., 
identifying, based on a graph, exactly how many patients in a treatment group are alive after 
five years; Lipkus, Peters, Kimmick, Liotcheva, & Marcom, 2010; Weinfurt et al., 2003), 
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which are rapidly forgotten in any case (Sepucha et al., 2013). Misremembering the risk of 
death from surgery as 10% (when it is actually 2%) is superior, from a gist perspective, than 
misremembering it as zero, although 0% is numerically closer to the true value of 2% 
(Reyna & Hamilton, 2001). In this instance, informed consent consists of recognizing that 
there is some (small) risk of death from surgery (i.e., communicating the categorical 
possibility of death; Han, Klein, & Arora, 2011). Similarly, IDM consists of recognizing 
some ambiguity surrounding estimates of risk--without losing the gist that some risks are 
higher than others. In fact, recent research based on FTT has shown that estimating a range 
of potential probabilities (which acknowledges ambiguity), rather than a point estimate, 
reduces biases (Brown, Nowlan, Taylor, & Morley, 2013). The critical goal is to 
communicate the gist of ambiguity in a manner that minimizes unreflective aversion by 
helping patients understand not the exact endpoints of a confidence interval, but the bottom-
line message that ambiguity applies to risk estimates—that their true risk is not known with 
the precision that a point estimate implies (Han et al., 2011).
More generally, as shown in psycholinguistic research, multiple gist interpretations exist of 
the same information, and are usually encoded. Thus, IDM usually involves encoding 
several key qualitative facts, for example, that there is risk and ambiguity and risks and 
benefits trade off, but, nevertheless, one treatment far exceeds another in benefits (Tait et al., 
2010). In most situations, the number of alternative gist representations is small and 
predictable for people with similar background knowledge. However, these representations 
cannot be reduced to a rote formula—such as assigning the same labels to identical 
probabilities. The meaning of, say, 20% chance of rain (low) and 20% chance of invasive 
cancer (high) differ greatly (Reyna, 2013). A major gap in research that emerges from this 
analysis is to establish principles and best practices for gist extraction in cancer decision 
making, including their measurement and evaluation.
In sum, FTT suggests that decision support interventions for IDM should: (a) ensure that 
patients understand the essential gist meaning of information (which is not the same thing as 
presenting less information); (b) remind patients of an array of simple social and moral 
values that are important to them and that have relevance to the decision at hand (because 
even strongly held values are not necessarily retrieved); and (c) assist patients in applying 
their values to their mental representations, ensuring that overlapping sets are disentangled 
(Bartels, Bauman, Skitka, & Medin, 2009; Reyna, 2008; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006).
Future research should focus on integrating evidence-based principles from multiple 
theoretical perspectives to discover how semantic and contextual factors shape patients’ 
perceptions of the gist of information (e.g., categorization of risk as low vs. high); how 
patients’ understanding of evaluative categories (e.g., outcomes of treatments as good vs. 
bad) can be supported; how values can be elicited that are stable and that reliably map onto 
future wellbeing; and how these processes differ across individuals and age groups that 
reflect the changing demographics of decision makers.
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